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ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS OF AN EXECUTOR UNDER
A WILL WHICH ESTABLISHES A RESIDUARY TRUST
Determining the Share of the Income Distributableto the Life
Tenant During the Executorship-What Constitutes
True Income-Finding the "Clear" Residue.

By LEROY MCWHINNEY, of the Denver Bar; Vice-President,
The InternationalTrust Company.
In order to present in concrete form the problem stated
in the caption of this paper, let us assume the commonplace
situation of an estate in which the will disposes of the decedent's personal effects, provides for one or more cash legacies,
and gives the residue to a trustee to pay the income therefrom
to A (let us say the widow) for life, with remainder over to B
(let us say the son), with no definition of income and no direction as to the date from which the life tenant shall receive the
income. It is immaterial to our illustration whether the executor and trustee are one and the same person or institution or
are different persons or institutions.
The situation thus stated is the typical groundwork for
a residuary testamentary trust. After delivering the personal
effects to the legatees entitled thereto, the executor will proceed
to distribute the balance of such an estate about as follows:
To the expenses of the last illness and funeral, which he will pay
almost immediately; to the expenses of administration, little of which
will be paid until he is ready to close his final accounts; to debts, which
he will discharge from time to time as allowed and funds therefor become
available; to inheritance, estate and other taxes which he will pay at
various dates; then to the legacies; and finally will turn over what he
has left to the trustee--ordinarily about fifteen to eighteen months after
the death of the testator. Duri.g the course of his executorship he may
also, doubtless should, make some distributions of income to the life

tenant.

As to scarcely a single one of these disbursements can the
executor know in advance the amount thereof or the date when
it will be made. Obviously, however, the executor may not
thus complete his administration without determining what
among his various receipts is true income, what, of that which
is true income, is distributable to the life tenant, and what
constitutes the principal or capital fund of the residue to be
turned over to the trustee. It follows that these three determinations are actually involved in every case of a residuary
testamentary trust and that few problems of mixed probate
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law and accounting are of greater practical importance to both
executors and their counsel.
At first approach the answer to these questions may appear simple. We are naturally impelled to say that the income
in the hands of the executor is the aggregate of the dividends,
interest, rents, royalties, and the like, which he receives; that
the income distributable to the life tenant is all of the income
received by the executor; that the residue is just what it appears to be: namely, the mass left in the executor's hands when
he comes into court to settle his final accounts. Not so. Probably no. one of these first blush impressions will square with
the weight of authority.
In practice there is a tendency to ignore such questions,
partly because they present considerable difficulty and partly
because we sometimes assume that the executor's discharge will
forever bury his faults, with no real damage to the life beneficiary. This latter assumption is too dangerous for comfort.
It has at least once been squarely held that even though the
executor has grossly under-distributed to the life tenant, the
error cannot be corrected after the executor has settled his
accounts, that the trustee may not make the adjustment, and
that the loss to the life tenant is permanent.* It is, therefore,
plainly the executor's duty to make an honest effort at correct
accounting.
In the discussion which follows it will be necessary for
us to make frequent reference to five factors in our problem.
For the sake of brevity it seems best at the outset to christen
these factors and to agree upon a definition for each, which we
may do as follows:
1. Actual Income embraces all receipts in the nature of income or
which are commonly called income.
2.
True Income is that which the law considers to be income
for a particular purpose in hand-here, as between life tenant and
remainderman.
3. Equitable Income is that income arrived at by applying a rate
of interest deemed by equity to represent a fair average return on a
given class of securities during a given period.
4. Clear Residue is that property which does (or will) constitute
the principal of the residuary trust in the hands of the trustees.
5. Eligible Assets or Securities are those of a character which the
executor and trustee are authorized to permanently retain or to purchase.

Broadly stated, the commonly accepted doctrines with
*Selleck v. Hawley (Mo. 1932). 56 S. W. 387, 395.
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reference to the three phases of the executor's accounting here
under consideration may be thus summarized:
First: THE RULE FOR DETERMINING TRUE INCOME
To arrive at his true income the executor should exclude from his
actual receipts in the general nature of income the following:
(a)
Apportionable income (such as interest and rents) accrued
at the date of death,
(b) All income from wasting assets,
(c) All income from ineligible investments,
(d) Requisite sums to amortize premiums on bonds purchased by
the executor;
and contra should include:
Equitable income on account of wasting or ineligible assets.
Second: THE RULE FOR DETERMINING THE LIFE
TENANT'S INCOME
The income available for distribution by the executor to the life
tenant during the period of the executorship is that part of the true
income which arises, or is deemed by equity to arise, from the clear
residue-as distinguished from income arising from assets which never
become a part of the clear residue. This latter class of income does not
go to the life tenant, but does go to the principal of the residue.
Third: THE RULE FOR DETERMINING RESIDUAL
PRINCIPAL
The residual principal is determined by deducting the amount of
the life tenant's income (for the period of the executorship) from the
residual mass remaining in the hands of the executor after all other
distributions and disbursements have been completed. This operation
should be performed by the executor. Subsequent determination by the
trustee may be permissible, but in view of the holding of the Missouri
court above mentioned denying such right to the trustee, it is safer to
have this duty fully discharged by the executor.

Let us next consider briefly the theory of the law which
underlies the rules we have just stated. There is in the somewhat confused body of decisions and text writers' statements
a fairly solid core of opinion representing the weight of authority and substantially consistent with the principles
adopted and announced in the Restatement of the Law of
Trusts. Underlying the whole subject is the premise, thoroughly established by the best authority, that, in such a case
as ours, the gift made by the testator in providing for the residuary trust is of a residue to be ascertained in accordance with
the rules of equity and which the courts commonly call the
"clear" residue; and a gift of the income arising from that

"clear" residue.

And it is likewise true that in our jurisdic-
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tion, and most other jurisdictions, the right to receive this
income dates from the death of the testator. It seems to me
that this conception may be likened to a gift of the kernel of a
nut, which gift does not include the hull or the shell. The
kernel is the clear residue and the shell is that part of the gross
estate which goes to pay debts, expenses, legacies, etc. By this
same doctrine the kernel which is thus bequeathed to the trustee is deemed in equity to exist within the shell from the beginning: i. e., from the date of the testator's death. And furthermore, it is deemed to consist of that type of asset of which it
ultimately must be made to consist: namely, of eligible assets
and nothing else. Obviously, eligible assets may be of either
or both of two classes which are not necessarily alike:
First--Securitiesowned by the testator, the permanent retention of
which he has actually authorized in his will; and
Second-The type of securities which he has authorized the trustee

or executor to purchase for reinvestment (in the absence of expressed
authority, then securities authorized by statute).

We recognize, however, that the clear residue may in fact
temporarily include non-eligible assets. In such case, equity
will consider that these non-eligible assets have actually been
converted to eligible investments as of the date of the death of
the testator and that the income derived therefrom, for the
purposes of accounting between life tenant and remainderman,
is that income which would have been produced thereby had
such non-eligible assets been so converted. The income thus
arbitrarily raised by equity is equitable income, as we have
already defined that phrase.
Now, if we grant the premises just stated, and such is the
weight of authority, we may easily proceed to adopt the following corollaries:
1. That the income available for the life tenant is only that
income arising from the clear residue or kernel (because the bequest of
income is, by its very terms, of the income on the clear residue, and on
that only).
2. That such income is the actual income produced by eligible
assets (less required premium amortization), plus equitable income on
non-eligible or wasting assets temporarily held in the clear residue.
3. That the balance of the actual income received by the executor
from all sources is added to principal-is, therefore, applicable to the
payment of debts, expenses, legacies, etc., and thereby, in effect, augments

the clear residue.
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The courts and text writers accepting these principles
differ somewhat in their detailed application. For example,
there are two well recognized methods of determining the
amount of income available for the life tenant, or, conversely,
the amount of income which is to be transferred to principal.
First Method: One group, including the authors of the
Restatement of the Law of Trusts, get at it by first computing
the amount of income applicable to the payment of debts, legacies, expenses, etc., which sum, once determined, they then
subtract from the aggregate true income and credit the balance
of the true income to the life tenant. To illustrate: Assume,
for the sake of simplicity, that the various sums paid out by
the executor on various dates for debts, taxes, legacies, or expenses, and the like, aggregate $20,000 and were all paid out
on the same day, exactly twelve months after the testator's
death. The sponsors of the first method would determine the
sum which, at death, plus interest at an equitable rate for
twelve months, would equal $20,000. Let us say, $19,400.
They would apply $600 of the true income, plus $19,400 of
principal to pay debts, expenses, etc., thereby diminishing by
such $600 the income otherwise available for the life tenant,
and, in effect, thereby augmenting the clear residue by the
same $600. In a fairly substantial estate, with the payment
of legacies and Federal estate taxes delayed for twelve months
or more, this sum is substantial and important. In practice,
the first (or Restatement) method, which we have just illustrated, is complicated by the variety of the sums to be paid,
and of the dates upon which payment is made, and is further
complicated by the fact that its application requires that the
apparent or actual income in the hands of the executor be first
reduced to true income in accordance with the principles above
outlined.
Second Method: The other, or second method, which we
may call the equitable rule, is more simple, produces about the
same mathematical result and seems to have no important disadvantages. Its disciples wait until the executor is ready to
file his final account, at which period the residual mass is automatically determined. They then appraise the actual residual
assets and determine their present worth as of the date of the
testator's death, at equitable interest. To illustrate: Assume
the residual assets to be worth $103,000; the elapsed time to
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be an even year; the equitable rate of interest to be 3 %; divide
the $103,000 by 1.03; the resulting $100,000 is the principal
forming the clear residue; the $3,000 is the income distributable to the life tenant. True, the executor may have already
distributed some income to the life tenant based upon his minimum estimate of the net result. If so, the amount so distributed is added to the value of the residual assets before effecting
the division.*
While the limits of this article do not permit of a comprehensive review of the authorities, we may examine a few.
At the outset we may note that the fundamental principle of
our rule of procedure in such cases is of English origin and that
the leading case is Allhusen v. Whittell, L. R. 4 Eq. 295
(1867).f
*The equitable rule, illustrated in the body of the article, contemplates a valuation
of the residual.assets at the time when they are ready to be turned over by the executor
to the trustee. Obviously, this value may differ materially from the value (actual or theoretical) as of the date of the testator's death, and this situation seems fairly recognized by
the courts, particularly in Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581. In the Edwards case the
non-eligible asset was unimproved real estate inventoried by the executor at $150,000.
appraised when turned over to the trustee at $155,000, and later sold by the trustee
for about $196,000. This was, therefore, a case in which the conversion of the noneligible asset was postponed beyond the date of the transfer of the trust fund by the
executor to the trustee. The court took the ultimately realized value (approximately
$196,000) as the basis for determining the income of the life tenant from the date of
the testator's death to the date of conversion. This seems to recognize a practice of
postponing the determination of the life tenant's income on non-eligible assets until
after the executor has closed his accounts. The power of the court to go back of the
final settlement of the executor's accounts was apparently not challenged in this case.
In the case of Mulcahy v. Johnson, 80 Colo. 499, being an equitable action against the
trustees after the executor had been discharged, the court approved and directed distribution by the trustees to the life tenant of funds in the hands of the trustees which arose
from income received by the executor. Apparently the right to raise such question
after the closing of the executor's accounts was not presented in the case. However, in
view of the doctrine announced in the case of Selleck v. Hawley (supra), the practice
of postponing the determination of the life tenant's income for the period of the executorship until after the executor's accounts have been closed is not to be commended.
Consequently, it is doubtless wiser, in a case where the actual liquidation or conversion
of the ineligible assets does not take place during the executorship, to nevertheless settle
the question of the life tenant's income for the period of the executorship at the time
when the executor closes his accounts and turns over the assets to the trustee. This
could have been done in the Edwards case without violence to the principle involved, if
the life tenant's income attributable to the real estate during the executorship had been
settled at the close of the executorship on the basis of a valuation of $155,000 and her
income attributable to that source for the subsequent period intervening before the actual
conversion had been settled on the basis of a valuation of $196,000.
tThe syllabus in Allhusen v. Whittell reads as follows: "Where a testator has
bequeathed legacies, and given his residue to a tenant for life, with remainder over,
executors, though, as between themselves and the persons interested in the residue, they
are at liberty to have recourse to any funds they please in order to pay debts and legacies,
yet will be treated by the court, in adjusting the accounts between tenant for life and
remainderman, as having paid the debts and legacies not out of capital only, nor out of
income only, but with such portion of the capital as, together with the income of that
portion for one year, was sufficient for the purpose."
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The English doctrine is likewise stated with apparent
approval in Perry on Trusts, 7th Edition, paragraph 551,
page 940. t
Perhaps the best textbook statement of the rule as now
embodied in the American procedure is that by Loring in his
Trustee's Handbook, 4th Edition (1928), page 154, which
reads as follows:
"In general, at the time the estate comes into the trustee's hands
it is all principal in whatever condition it may happen to be, and all
yearly increase thereafter is income. This would always be the case if
the property came to him without delay and in the form of proper trust
investments. Unless the settlor provides otherwise, the life tenant is
entitled to income from the time of the testator's death; therefore, when
for any reason property does not come into the hands of the trustee for
some time after the beginning of the trust, the fund when received will
be so apportioned that the life tenant will get the proper rate of interest
from the beginning of the trust, and the remainder will be the principal.
"Where the trust fund is established by a legacy, ordinarily it will
not be paid over by the executors until they wind up the estate and settle
their accountn. This will necessarily be so if the trust fund is the residue
of the estate. The general rule as applied in such cases is to find that sum
which, with interest from the date of the testator's death at the rate
which it would have earned if properly invested, will with the interest
added equal the sum received from the executors."

Similar statements of the rule in Cyc. and R. C. L. are
cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. In
re Leitsch's Will, 20.1 N. W. 284 (1924).§
f"When the trust principal is a residue which cannot be exactly ascertained until
after the payment of debts and legacies which do not bear interest during the first year
after the testator's death, it has been held, and seems to be the rule in England, that the
life tenant should be given, not the income of the whole estate, but the income only
of so much of the estate as is ultimately to constitute the trust fund. This principal of
the residuary estate is to be determined by deducting from the entire fund out of which
debts and legacies are to be paid, the sum which, 'together with the income of such part
for the year, will be wanted for the payment of debts, legacies, and other charges, during
the year; and the proper and necessary fund must be ascertained by including the income
for one year which may arise upon the fund which may be so wanted.' "
§40 Cyc. page 1882. "It is settled by the great weight of authority that in the
case of a bequest of a life estate in a residuary fund, or of some aliquot part thereof, if
no time is prescribed in the will for the commencement of the interest or the enjoyment
of the use or income of such residue, the legatee for life is 'entitled to the interest or
income of the clear residue, as afterward ascertained to be computed from the time of
the death of the testator."
28 R. C. L. page 355. "So where there is the bequest. of the whole or of an
aliquot part of the residue of an estate to a legatee for life, remainder over, and no time
is fixed by the will for the commencementof such life use, the legatee is entitled to the
use or income of the clear residue so bequeathed, as the same may be at last ascertained
to be computed from the death of the testator."
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In Stanley v. Stanley, 142 At. 851, 855-856 (Conn.
1928), the residue was given one-half outright to Stanley and
one-half to trustees to pay the income for life to A with remainder to B. The point for discussion was the'disposition of
the income earned on Stanley's half of the residue during the
executorship, which income the court allocated to the residue;
i.e., one-half to Stanley and the other one-half to the principal
of the trust fund. The court said in part:
"The other one-half of the income earned (i. e., the part earned
on

*

*

*

Stanley's legacy) did not belong to

*

*

*

Stanley

(as income) for he was a general legatee, nor to the trustee (as income)
* *
* since they had received all of the income which their one-half
had earned. The will does not dispose of it otherwise than by the
residuary clause. Necessarily it became a part of the residue and subject
to the disposition made of all the residue, one-half to * * * Stanley
and one-half to the trustees

*

*

*

*

*

*

We are asked, in view

of the conclusions reached, as to the disposition of the undisposed of
income, whether it became principal or income

*

*

*.

It became

(Words within parentheses
part of the residue and hence principal."
are explanatory and were not used by the court.)

To the same effect is the language of the Restatement of
the Law of Trusts, at Section 234, paragraph g, which reads
as follows:
"To the extent to which the income received by the executor during
the period of administration is derived from property which is subsequently used in paying legacies and discharging debts and expenses of
administration, and has not been applied to the payment of interest on
such legacies, debts and expenses, the trustee is entitled to receive the
same, but it should be added to principal and not paid to the beneficiary
entitled to income."

Upon the method of computing the "clear" residue and
the life tenant's share of the income, the authority for the first
method mentioned above is also the Restatement at Section
234 in a later portion of paragraph g.£ The second method,
or so-called "equitable" rule, is very clearly presented in the
case of Equitable Trust Company v. Kent, 101 Ati. 875, 877878 (Del. Chancery 1917), where the court reviews the whole
problem, notes the desirability of simplification, adds a fine
statement from Hill on Trustees, and approves Mr. Loring's
£See also Accounting Principles and Procedure, Lecture 45, by Charles H. Linger.
C.P.A., and Harold D. Greeley of the New York Bar (published by Walton School of
Commerce, Chicago, Ill.).
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rule above quoted. The concluding portion of this part of the
opinion reads as follows:

. "The simplest, most practicable and equitable rule is that which
Hill on Trustees says has the weightiest authority, and which is adopted
in Loring's Trustees' Handbook at page 122 (3d ed.), viz., equitable
instead of actual income-that is to say, the sum which the life beneficiary would have received at the end of a year after the death of the
testator if the trust fund had been invested at a certain selected rate of
interest from the death of the testator. To illustrate, if the fund was
$10,000 and the interest rate be fixed at five per cent, then if that sum
be divided by 105 the result, $9,523.80, will represent principal and the
balance, $476.20, will represent income for one year. This latter sum
being five per cent of the former. This method is the simplest because
it is based on simple terms in the calculation thereof; is not dependent
on the classifications of the estate by the executor; and disregards the
sources from which the fund is produced. It is equitable because it is
applicable to productive and unproductive assets; includes proceeds of
real estate as well as personalty; disregards proportions of productivity
of income; includes all kinds of income such as rents, interest, dividends
and accretions; and, which is highly important, gives to the life beneficiary income for the first year unaffected by the delays of executors in
administering the estate of the decedent, or in paying over and delivering
the trust fund.
"It would be applicable whether there was, or was not, an equitable conversion of realty into personalty. It should also be applied in
cases where the trustee by authority of the Court of Chancery takes in
specie in payment of a legacy property of the decedent, * * *
"The rate of interest should be such as a trustee by careful, conservative investment in suitable trust investments could reasonably realize
as interest or income, and should not be the legal rate of interest fixed
by law as between debtor and creditor. Edwards v. Edwards, 183
Mass. 581, 67 N. E. 658."

Further statements and numerous citations, both pro and
con, will be found in Restatement of Trusts, Tentative Draft
No. 4 (American Law Institute), pages 195-197.J
Now it will be noted that, if the last mentioned, or second
JAmong the relatively recent decisions are two which hold that the life tenant of
a residuary trust is entitled to the interest arising on sums, which sums were later applied
to the payment of debts, legacies, etc., and are, therefore, in direct conflict with the rules
cited in the body of the article. The first of these cases is Old Colony Trust Company
v. Smith, 165 N. E. 657 (Mass. 1929), and the second is City Bank Farmers Trust

Company v. Taylor, 163 Atl. 734 (Rd. Is. 1933).

The second case relies chiefly on

the first case for its authority and the applicability of all the other authorities cited by
both cases is fairly subject to question. It must probably be assumed that the decision
in these cases was a deliberate attempt to change the rule to effect what these courts
thought to be simplicity and the increased advantage of the life tenant. In neither of
these cases was there involved any question of the income from non-productive, wasting,

or ineligible assets.
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method is applied, it will not be necessary, in determining
either the life tenant's income or the "clear" residue, to go into
a determination of what part of the actual income was true
income because the so-called equitable rule automatically confines the life tenant to equitable income (which will approximate the true income on the clear residue). Nevertheless, we
may note in closing certain landmark authorities on the manner of determining true income, as distinguished from what is
sometimes called the actual income. As a premise we may
review at the outset the axiom that the trustee is under a duty
to dispose of property included in the trust at the time of its
creation which would not be a proper investment for the trustee to make, unless specially authorized to permanently retain
such property. (Restatement of Law of Trusts, Sec. 230.)
From this premise we naturally proceed to the question of the
disposition to be made of the actual income received from the
assets which the trustee was under a duty to sell. As above
indicated, the answer is that the life tenant is entitled to equitable income on the actual or theoretical proceeds of such
assets as if converted to eligibles on the day of the testator's
death; that, if the actual exceeds the equitable income, the
excess goes to principal; while, if the actual is less than the
equitable income, the deficiency will be raised from principal.
Sec. 241 of the Restatement deals with the subject as follows:
"* * * if property held in trust * * * is property which
the trustee is under a duty to sell, and which produces no income or an
income substantially less than the current rate of return on trust investments, or which is wasting property or produces an income substantially
more than the current rate of return on trust investments, and the trustee
does not immediately sell the property, the trustee should make an apportionment of the proceeds of the sale when made.
"The net proceeds received from the sale of the property are apportioned by ascertaining the sum which with interest thereon at the current
rate of return on trust investments from the day when the duty to sell
arose to the day of the sale would equal the net proceeds; and the sum
so ascertained is to be treated as principal, and the residue of the net proceeds as income. * * * In this case the beneficiary is entitled to
income calculated from the day of the creation of the trust, since the
duty to sell arises at that time, although by the terms of the trust the
trustee is authorized to postpone the sale or although he properly postpones the sale because the sale could not be effected immediately without
undue loss to the trust."

The leading case is Hemenway v. Hemenway, 134 Mass.
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446, 450-452, where the rule regarding income from noneligible assets temporarily retained is thus stated:

"It often happens, of course, that testators leave property of a

kind which executors would not be authorized to invest in * * *
In such cases, the law allows the executor a proper time for the purpose
of disposing of such property. But the fact that time is allowed in
order to prevent a sacrifice does not make the investment an authorized
one ad interim in such sense as to entitle the tenant for life to the actual
dividends. The conversion would be made at once, if it were practicable,
and the rights of the parties are not affected by the delays. The fund is
treated as if converted and the tenant for life is allowed a fixed percentage
on the amount. * * * The same thing is true where a testator
allows time for the same purpose."

While the rules thus stated are the more logical, are sustained by the best reasoned cases and text book authorities, and
apparently constitute the only accounting system which can
be squared with the conclusions so painstakingly arrived at by
the authors of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, there is
much conflict in the authorities. Moreover, these rules are
general principles, subject, at best, to some exceptions and
some special applications, for the development of which there
is no place in this outline. For example: the subject of allocation between principal and income in the case of defaulted
and foreclosed mortgages, upon which there is much recent
authority, some of which is highly confusing, but which may,
in the main, be reconciled with the general rules of apportionment on the basis of equitable income from the date of default.
See Columbia Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, page 61.
The modern Massachusetts rule, as established in the Old
Colony Trust Company case (supra), or the similar rule recently established by statute in New York, or any one or more
of numerous special rules or variations suggested by other
courts, may appear to one or another of us more satisfactory
than the majority rules above reviewed. In this paper, however, our object is not to devise or adopt an ideal, but to state
the law as we find it. We are substantially without judicial
precedent in Colorado and cannot forecast the action of our
Supreme Court on these questions. The Commissioners on
Uniform Laws have prepared an accounting code endeavoring
to arbitrarily settle a large number of such points, but that
code is undergoing considerable dispute and has been adopted
by but two states. Probably we will long be without either
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judicial or legislative guides in this state. In the meantime, it
would seem wisest to follow the majority rules as far as practicable, yet simplifying our work whenever possible by the
exercise of some foresight. Specifically, it is most respectfully
suggested to the members of the bar that as they write the wills
of the future they either embody an accounting code of their
own or expressly give to the executor and trustee adequate
powers to conduct his accounting according to his own best
judgment, or according to the opinion of his counsel, making
such decisions conclusive on the parties in interest.
July 25, 1937.
DEAR DICTA:

In the interest of learning rather than of the law, attention is directed to our state Supreme Court's opinion in Assurance Society vs. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, where at page 235
of the opinion the court quotes Mr. Justice Cordozo as having
said:
"The attempted
distinction between accidental results
plunge this branch of the law into
means
will
and accidental
a Serbonian bog," following which our court with delightful
humor says: "Whatever kind of bog that is we concur." To
which may we add the words of Webster's Unabridged:
"Serbonian bog: A large bog or lake in Egypt surrounded by hills of loose sand, which, being blown into it,
afforded a treacherous footing; figuratively, a difficult or complicated situation; a mess; a predicament."

This is not intended in any wise as a reflection upon the
undoubted learning of the Chief Justice who wrote this opinion, and who gave this graceful gesture of modesty and good
humor. His opinions are too frequently adorned with references to sources of learning too deep and far removed from the
browsings of the average mind to admit of such implication.
As instance, in Baker vs. Couch, 74 Colo. 380, at page 382,
these words of his:
"Said contract, upon which one of the defenses is based,

recited that its consideration was love and affection, but if any
deity presided over this affair it is evident that it was not
Athenian Venus but Babylonian Ishtar."

Sincerely yours,
W. FELDER COOK.

